Determining an Expected House Majority Using Pattern Analysis by Clark, Jesse T.
The University of Maine
DigitalCommons@UMaine
Honors College
Spring 5-2016
Determining an Expected House Majority Using
Pattern Analysis
Jesse T. Clark
University of Maine
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/honors
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors College by
an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UMaine. For more information, please contact um.library.technical.services@maine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Clark, Jesse T., "Determining an Expected House Majority Using Pattern Analysis" (2016). Honors College. 375.
https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/honors/375
DETERMINING AN EXPECTED HOUSE MAJORITY USING PATTERN 
ANALYSIS 
by  
Jesse T. Clark 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial fulfillment of the  
Requirements for a Degree with Honors  
(Political Science) 
 
 
 
 
The Honors College 
University of Maine 
May 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advisory Committee:  
 Richard J. Powell, PhD, Professor of Political Science, Advisor 
Amy Fried, PhD, Professor of Political Science 
Chris Mares, MA, Intensive English Institute, Director 
 Mark D. Brewer, PhD, Chair and Professor of Political Science 
Matthew P. Dube, PhD, School of Computing and Information Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2016 Jesse T. Clark 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
iii	  
 
Abstract 
 
Since the early 1800s, state committees and legislatures have been drawing 
districts in order to win elections by splitting and grouping populations to promote their 
chances of victory, a process called gerrymandering. Little consensus can be found in 
past work as some studies claim that current partisan gridlock is partially related to this 
procedure, while other works have found that sorting and the spatial distribution of 
partisanship account for gridlock. This exercise seeks to measure the impact of 
gerrymandering by comparing the party makeup of the current U.S. House delegation to 
the natural partisan makeup of a state as determined by a randomized process.  
This project removes political bias in the redistricting process through a series of 
Monte Carlo simulations to randomly assign Census tracts to ad hoc districts that are 
within one percent population of each other in a given state. These aggregated districts 
and corresponding demographic data are then compared to historical House election 
results from the modern era to produce likely victors using a regression model. This 
approach determines a framework for the natural partisanship of the congressional 
delegation from each state. The delegation suggested by the regression model is then 
compared to the actual partisan makeup of each delegation, producing evidence that is 
used to evaluate the impact of current redistricting practices on the party makeup of 
Congress. This process can be used to predict the election results of potential redistricting 
plans, and potentially identify the use of gerrymandering in a way that can have serious 
implications for litigation and policymaking surrounding redistricting.  
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might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy as 
a civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous 
ancestors." 
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Introduction 
Section 1 
 
 “This is more reminiscent of a broken-winged pterodactyl, lying prostrate across 
the center of the State,” U.S. District Court for the State of Maryland Judge Nieyemer 
wrote in his opinion in Fletcher v. Lamone. The judge admitted the shape of the district 
was “suspect,” but did not violate the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act because the 
state could show proof that it was drawn with partisan intentions, rather than racial 
prejudice (Fletcher, 2011). In this case, the gerrymander was allowed to crawl away, 
unharmed.  
Gerrymandering, or the drawing of legislative districts to give partisan advantage, 
has been hotly debated on many levels. Is it ethical? Does it deprive people of their right 
to vote? Is it legal? Members of Congress, the media, and the courts in have asked these 
questions in recent years, and there seems to be no clear answer. Literature claims that 
this practice is to blame for the current partisan atmosphere in Congress, which allegedly 
produces candidates that are more ideologically pure than they would be with districts 
drawn to be less demographically homogeneous. This question of partisanship has been 
debated in partisan fashion, with Democrats accusing Republicans of benefitting from the 
practice (Drum, 2013), whereas Republicans say that their seemingly constant majority in 
the House of Representatives is due to population dynamics, with liberals living clustered 
in cities and more people relocating to southern states (Caroll, 2014).  
In 1812, Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry of the Federalist Party signed a 
redistricting map into law that was meant to corral the opposing party—the Democratic 
Republicans— into consolidated districts meant to limit their overall presence in the state 
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legislature. When a Federalist reporter noted that it looked like a lizard, his editor said 
“Salamander? Call it a Gerrymander!” (Ward, 1892). With this utterance, the term 
“gerrymandering” entered the American lexicon, where it has stayed ever since.   
For nearly a half century after Gerry’s infamous redistricting, the federal 
government did little to prevent states from drawing congressional districts in any way 
they saw fit. The federal government did not interfere with the redistricting process until 
1840, when it required contiguous, single-member districts (Shmeckebier, 1976). In 
1872, Congress started to require that districts consist of “contiguous and compact 
territory, and containing as equal as nearly as practicable number of inhabitants,” 
(Congress, 1872). While it was later ruled that these requirements did not apply to 
subsequent redistricting schemes, these standards have remained common practice to a 
certain extent ever since (Monmonier, 2001).  
Until the 1960s, the practice of gerrymandering was carried out in conjunction 
with malaportionment, which is the practice of drawing districts with vastly different 
populations. Malaportionment was largely used to “pack” ethnic minorities in 
disproportionately large districts in the South (Monmonier, 2001). A simple example of 
malaportionment would be found in a state with a population of 10 million people, and 10 
districts. In this state, 9 districts could have an average of 500,000 people each, and the 
tenth  district would have a population of 5.5 million people.  In essence, this allows large 
proportions of the population to be placed in a single district, and deprives them of the 
same proportionality of vote that can be found in voters of adjacent districts. This process 
was challenged and subsequently banned by the SCOTUS in Baker v. Carr, and 
subsequently reinforced in Reynolds v. Sims. While these two cases effectively 
eliminated malaportionment, they also ruled that the redistricting process is a justiciable 
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question, a change from previous cases in which it was ruled that the redistricting process 
is simply a political question (Sims, 1964; Baker, 1984). This trend against politically 
motivated redistricting continued with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
(Legal, 2016), which had several facets such as a ban on redistricting based on race and 
need by the Justice Department for approval of districts in certain states, among others. 
Though several parts of the Voting Rights Act have been struck down by the courts, its 
impact on the redistricting process carries over to today.  
Without the freedom to vary district population, how is the process of partisan 
redistricting and carried out today? Simply put, today’s redistricting schemes are the 
result of the use of advanced computing, through the combination of modeling and 
geographic manipulation. The rise of computers in the 1960s allowed the calculation of 
data on a scale that had never before been possible in human history. Many political 
scientists believed that these technological advancements would cause gerrymandering to 
become a relic of history, as they would allow greater scrutiny of proposed redistricting 
plans (Monmonier, 2001). Political parties quickly dashed these hopes, as they who 
instead used these tools for partisan advantage by calculating districts to fit their needs.  
These tools gave rise to Geographic Information Systems (GISs), a type of software that 
allows users to manipulate spatial and attribute information with relative speed and 
accuracy (Bolstad, 2012). With the introduction by the U.S. Census Bureau of Dual 
Independent Map Encoding (DIME) files in 1970 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015), and the 
more powerful Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing 
(TIGER/Line) files in 1990, the redistricting process has become almost entirely digitized 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). While DIME files provided the ability to connect areas into 
districts based on block population, TIGER/Line also paired this topological information 
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with population demographics (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). This advancement, paired 
with increasingly powerful GISs and easy to use suites, allowed even the most 
technologically unsophisticated user the ability to draw districts with accuracy and 
demographic precision that had never before been practical (Monmonier, 2001). As of the 
2000 Census and subsequent reapportionment and redistricting, only one state had its 
congressional districts drawn without the aid of GIS software (Mann, 2005). Today, this 
process is completed using Earth Science Research Institute (ESRI) or Caliper products 
combined with voting results, both of which allow users to draw districts using 
demographic and population data and to predict voting results (ESRI, 2012 and Caliper, 
2015).  
While there have been a plethora of legal challenges to individual redistricting 
schemes and even entire redistricting practices that have reached SCOTUS in the past 50 
years, the most consequential to the redistricting process on a national scale (and to this 
paper) is Vieth v. Jubelier. In this case, SCOTUS ruled “political gerrymandering claims 
are nonjusticiable because no judicially discernible and manageable standards for 
adjudicating such claims exist,” (Vieth, 2004). While this was a blow to the Democratic 
Party of Pennsylvania, it did leave an opening; while it stated that gerrymandering was 
nonjusticiable, it also said that a renewed metric could be developed for use in future 
cases before SCOTUS. This project serves as an important step towards that, as stated in 
the conclusion.  
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Mathematical Background 
Section 2 
 
  This section contains the in-depth mathematical background needed to truly 
understand the redistricting process at a conceptual and applied level, which can then be 
applied to the political realm. Interested readers may find it pertinent to continue with this 
section. Due to the fact that this impacted the methodology but not the conclusion of this 
work, readers more interested in the political considerations and implications of this 
exercise may skip to Section 3.  
In order to examine gerrymandering and issues around current redistricting 
practices pertaining to their impact on the makeup of the U.S. Congress, one must first 
examine the conceptual framework behind the redistricting process and gerrymandering. 
These principles include contiguity, the mathematical definition of a congressional 
district, and the proportion of votes needed to be victorious. To further examine the 
disadvantages of using geometry to provide evidence of gerrymandering, one must 
examine the implications of asymmetric and optimum geometric shapes as they pertain to 
the redistricting process. Only after these are examined at a conceptual level can one 
attempt to truly understand gerrymandering, and begin to offer ways in which it s effects 
can mathematically studied.  
 Principle 2.1 According to the Redistricting Act of 1842, districts should be 
compact and contiguous, as each district should be one comprehensive unit (Campbell, 
1842). Today, computer programs draw all congressional districts, which work by 
connecting different areas in order to satisfy these given requirements. Since computers 
cannot read images without visual inspection, the mathematical discipline of graph theory 
must be applied to determine a viable district. It is necessary to understand this concept in 
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order to fully comprehend the methodology of this exercise, which can be seen in part as 
an application of graph theory.  
 To determine contiguity in a graph, it is necessary to have a common language 
with which to address the structure, independent of its spatial location.  This language can 
be borrowed from mathematics. 
 
Definition 2.1:  Let the set V be a collection of elements comprising the studied 
universe, and the set E be the binary associations between members vi, vj of the set 
V.  A graph, denoted by GV,E, is the combination of the set V, called its vertices, 
and the set E, called its edges. 
  
Graphs can be broken down into smaller components called subgraphs, much like 
any other set can be broken into smaller components called subsets.  Of particular interest 
are the subgraphs that maintain all of the edges present within the original graph between 
any pair of its vertices.  These subgraphs are called induced subgraphs. 
 
Definition 2.2:  Let GV,E be a graph and further let 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑉 and 𝑇 ⊆ 𝐸.  The graph 
GS,T is called an induced subgraph if all edges in E connecting si, sj ∈ 𝑆 from the 
set T. 
 
 To determine contiguity within a graph, there must be one further concept known 
as path-connectedness. 
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Definition 2.3:  Let E be the set of edges connecting a set of vertices V.  Vertices 
a and b are path-connected in GV,E if there exists a sequence of edges e1, e2,… en 
such that a is the starting vertex of e1 and b is the ending vertex of en. 
 
To demonstrate this, one can look to the state of Rhode Island. In order to find out 
how many subgraphs (combinations) of counties that one can make with Rhode Island, 
one must first look at a map of the state, which will then be turned into a corresponding 
graph. This particular map can be broken up into collections of counties, which will serve 
as testable subsets. What we are trying to find are how many different combinations of 
counties that we can make; the easiest way to do this is understand that there are 32 
different combinations of counties (25=32), representing the Boolean assignment of each 
element to the subset (1 for inclusion; 0 for exclusion).  To be a viable district, this subset 
must be path-connected. This connectivity is illustrated by the graph in Figure 2.1 (b), in 
which it is denoted by a line connecting different vertices (entities are assumed to be 
connected to themselves).  As can be seen, there are many different combinations, even 
for the relatively small state of Rhode Island. An adjacency matrix is used to easily 
denote continuity (1) and discontinuity (0). This can be seen in Figure 2.1 (c). 
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                               (a)                        (b)    𝑃 𝐾 𝐵 𝑊 𝑁𝑃 1 1 1 0 0𝐾 1 1 1 1 1𝐵 1 1 1 0 1𝑊 0 1 0 1 1𝑁 0 1 1 1 1
 
(c)  
Figure 2.1:  The state of Rhode Island as (a) a map, (b) a graph, and (c) an adjacency matrix. 
Using this matrix (Figure 1(c)), a connected subgraphs algorithm determined that 
26 of the combinations were in fact path-connected, and thus viable districts using only 
the concern of contiguity.  These are broken up by cardinality in Table 2.1 and 
enumerated in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.1:  Combinations of subsets of Rhode Island by cardinality. 
Counties used Number of 
Combinations 
Viable Combinations 
0 1 0 
1 5 5 
2 10 7 
3 10 8 
4 5 5 
5 1 1 
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Table 2.2:  Viable county subsets of Rhode Island 
 
Instance Counties Instance Counties 
1 P 14 PKW 
2 K 15 PBN 
3 B 16 KBW 
4 W 17 KBN 
5 N 18 KWN 
6 PK 19 PKN 
7 PB 20 BWN 
8 KB 21 PKBW 
9 KW 22 PKBN 
10 KN 23 PKWN 
11 BN 24 PBWN 
12 WN 25 BKWN 
13 PKB 26 PBKWN 
 
  
Using the premise that districts have to be contiguous, and using graph theory 
conventions, the state of Rhode Island was found to have 26 viable sets of counties that 
could be districts if their populations were acceptable for the purposes of redistricting. It 
is important to note that this process would be done using Census tracts for the purpose of 
drawing congressional districts.  
Principle 2.2. Definition of a District. What is a district? The U.S. Congress and 
the Justice Department desire more out of congressional districts than simple contiguity 
and compactness; in fact, there are four major criteria that a district should meet. The 
first, contiguity, was discussed in Principle 2.1. The second is that all districts in a state 
should have approximately equal population. Moreover, all districts must be pairwise 
disjoint, or mutually exclusive. This means that if an area is in district A, it cannot be in 
district B (i.e., no shared area). Finally, districts must be jointly exhaustive, namely that 
every place on the map is assigned to some district X.  As with the principle of contiguity, 
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the final three criteria have a common language that is used to address them that is 
independent of spatial location that is borrowed from mathematics. 
 Sets have particular properties.  Two properties of interest relative to redistricting 
are that the entire space is covered and that no place is in multiple districts.  These 
concepts are known in mathematics as jointly exhaustive and pairwise disjoint (JEPD). 
 
Definition 2.4:  Let M be a collection of sets and m* an element of M.  If  𝑚! = 𝑀!!!! , then M is said to be jointly exhaustive. 
Definition 2.5: Let M be a collection of sets and m* an element of M.  If  ∀𝑖, 𝑗   𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 :𝑚! ∩𝑚! = Ø, the collection M is said to be pairwise disjoint. 
  
The four constraints imposed on districts are that they must be contiguous (saving 
the necessity of islands), approximately equal in population in a given state, no point on 
the map is assigned to multiple districts, and all points are assigned to a district.  These 
concepts can be written out explicitly for subdivisions v1 to vn and potential district map 
units m*: 
Condition 2.1:  mi must satisfy Definition 2.3 with the exception of islands.  In the case 
of an island, it should be assigned to the nearest possible population. 
Condition 2.2:  Let pv be the population of a subdivision v.  ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 :   𝑝!!∈!! ≈𝑝!!∈!! . 
Condition 2.3:  The collection of sets M must be jointly exhaustive as in Definition 2.4. 
Condition 2.4:  The collection of sets M must be pairwise disjoint as in Definition 2.5. 
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Principle 2.3: How to Be Victorious. How do you win a district? Unlike many 
nations that have parliamentary systems of government in which seats are delegated to 
different parties based on a percentage of the vote, the U.S. employs a winner take all 
system, where the candidate with the most votes is victorious. The basic premise behind 
this system is that a winning candidate must receive a majority of the votes (50%+1 
vote), and that there can be only one winner in a race. The choices in this scenario adhere 
to the binary system that has been specified in previous works (Gelman, 1994). This 
system is actually two-tiered: 
 The first tier is within a single district, as a candidate must receive 50% + 1 of all 
voters, assuming that there is a binary choice. 
  The second tier is national, as a party (or aggregated candidates in a given 
party) must carry 50% + 1 of the all districts in order to win control the U.S. House of 
Representatives. This means that a party needs to win 218 seats to win control the 
chamber 
 The logical question is thus: What percentage of a vote is needed to be 
guaranteed to win the election?  A similar question would be for those more 
pessimistically inclined:  What percentage of a vote is needed to have a chance to win the 
election? 
 Since this exercise is somewhat governed by the numbers, a generalization 
method is required.  This generalization comes in the form of congruence classes. 
 
Definition 2.6:  Let n and d be integers.  Let r be the remainder of the division 
n/d.  For any given d, all n such that r would be the same are members of a 
congruence class.  Each integer d thus forms d separate congruence classes. 
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 An example of this would be the numbers 11, 21, and 31 relative to the integer 10.  
All of these would have remainder 1.  When we add numbers in base 10, any member of 
this congruence class could be interchanged for any other and not impact the ones-place 
of the calculation.  When referring to congruence classes, the form n ≡ 𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑  𝑑) is the 
standard notation. 
 Generalization is also required to the most simplistic case of modular arithmetic:  
odd and even.  This becomes particularly important when dividing numbers by 2.  Cutting 
odd numbers in half in a discrete space requires the use of something called a floor 
function. 
 
Definition 2.7:  Let a be a real number.  The largest integer less than or equal to a 
is called the floor of a, denoted as 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(𝑎). The floor function allows for the 
generalization of 50% + 1  
  
The general premise to win an election is that a candidate must win over half of 
the districts and to win each district, the candidate must win over half of the votes. To 
win over half of the districts, a candidate must win 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 !! + 1 of those districts.  If n 
were even, n/2 is an integer.  This does not constitute 50% + 1 of the districts, so an 
additional must be added.  If n were odd, n/2 is not an integer, but its floor is less than 
n/2, therefore an additional must be added.  Adding 1 in either case makes the quantity in 
excess of n/2 and guarantees that the quantity is an integer. 
 To win a district, a candidate must win over half of that district, which would 
follow a similar argument.  The only question here is the size of the district.  This 
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discussion is restricted to the case where all n districts would have identical integer 
populations, namely that 𝑝 ≡ 0(𝑚𝑜𝑑  𝑛).  Treating p/n as the size of the district, we can 
use the formula for winning over half of the districts to also apply here as each individual 
person represents one district in this election.  Thus, to win a district, the candidate must 
win 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 !!! + 1. 
 Thus to have a chance to win the election, a candidate (or party) must win a 
minimum of  
!"##$ !!! !! !"##$ !! !!!  of the popular vote.  From calculus, it can easily be 
seen that the limit of this equation is 25%. 
 Conversely, the act of being guaranteed to win an election is to be sure that the 
opponent cannot possibly win the election.  If an opponent must take y to have a chance, 
the candidate must take z > 1 – y to eliminate the opponent.  In this case, that would be 
1− !"##$ !!! !! !"##$ !! !!! . 
 In the case of the US House of Representatives, n = 435 and p = 308,745,600 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2013).  The proportion of votes need to have a chance is 0.2508, 
and conversely the proportion to be guaranteed would be 0.7492. 
In this exercise, it is shown that it is possible to win an election without achieving 
a majority of the vote. This means that a minority candidate (or a minority party in the 
case of the House of Representatives) can achieve victory in an election. The ability of 
minority candidates to achieve victory lies in the distribution of their votes among the 
districts such that they could win half of the votes in that district. This could happen in 
one of two ways: benign coincidence (people of like-minded views living in pre-
established districts, otherwise known as sorting), or through gerrymandering, the 
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intentional act of redistricting to favor one party over another.  As is discussed in the next 
principle, gerrymandering can have an impact on the shapes found on maps in the U.S.  
Principle 2.4: Characteristics of Odd Shapes.  As demonstrated in the previous 
principle, gerrymandering is the intentional act of redistricting to favor one party over the 
other. This can be done in two ways. The first is drawing the district to include desirable 
demographics. Conversely, districts can be drawn to separate support for the opposing 
party, and keep them from gaining a majority in another district. To do this, one must 
often sacrifice notion of compactness, or efficiently enclosing an area. Districts that have 
been gerrymandered often sacrifice this notion in order to encompass demographics that 
can be favorable to the districting party, or detrimental to the other party. One side effect 
of this geometrically is that it leaves behind a high perimeter-to-area ratio. One example 
of an object that has a low perimeter-to-area ratio is a hand that is laid on table with the 
digits put together. Now compare this with the same hand with the digits spread apart; in 
each instance, the hand still has the same area, but the perimeters are vastly different. A 
common metric used to determine that an area has been gerrymandered is based on the 
ratio of perimeter to area, as in the gerrymandering score (Ingraham, 2014). One must be 
cautious when using this ratio, though, as regular polygons with very small areas will 
have higher ratios than those with larger areas.  
 To find the ratio of area and perimeter, one must have generalized methods to 
calculate both the distance and area of arbitrary polygons. These methods are well 
established, known as arclength and the shoelace formula.  
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Definition 2.8: Let A be an arc. The arclength of A is the sum of the length of all of the 
line segments that make up A. This is computed as 𝑑 𝑎! ,𝑎!!!!!!!!! . 
 
 Arclength is not equivalent to perimeter unless the final vertex is equal to the first 
vertex. If the final vertex is not the first vertex, the perimeter would be arclength + d(an, 
a0).  d(x) is a distance function, and can take many forms.  In this case, Euclidean 
distance is used: (𝑥! − 𝑥!)! + (𝑦! − 𝑦!)!. 
 Calculating area is a similar process.  While curved lines are segmented into line 
segments, any area can be decomposed into triangles and then their areas summed up.  
This realization gives rise to the shoelace formula, also known as the surveryor’s 
formula. 
 
 Definition 2.9: Let (xi, yi) be vertices of a polygon P. The area of the polygon can 
be computed by 
!! !!!!!! !!!!!!!!!! ! !! !!!! !!! . 
 
 Using both the area and perimeter of an object, a measure of compactness for a 
geometric object can be constructed.  The particular measurement of interest in this case 
is a concept called circularity, namely how closely the perimeter and area of an object 
behave relative to the corresponding measurement of a circle, the most efficient use of a 
perimeter to enclose an area. 
 
Definition 2.10:  Let P be a polygon with perimeter p and area a.  The circularity 
C of an object is the quantity !!"!! . 
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To demonstrate this principle, these formulas were applied to the states of 
Wyoming, New Mexico, and West Virginia. To start, coordinates were applied to the 
vertices of the respective states, as seen in Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. The coordinates for 
the respective figures were inserted into Definitions 2.8 and 2.9 and their results divided 
to produce the perimeter-to-area ratio. It should be noted that coordinate degrees were 
used, and exact estimates are impacted by the natural irregular curvature of the Earth 
In states such as Wyoming and Colorado, the perimeter and area of the states can 
be easily found because they are nearly regular polygons. When the coordinates of the 
four corners of Wyoming were plugged into the equation, it was determined that the area 
was 28 square degrees, while the perimeter was 22°. This gave a ratio of 0.79.  The 
circularity measure of this state is 0.727. 
 
Figure 2.2:  Circularity Measurement of Wyoming 
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 States such as New Mexico and Utah are slightly different; they contain straight 
borders, but they are not regular polygons. For New Mexico, the coordinates had to be 
found for each major change in direction (eight in total). These coordinates were then 
substituted into Definitions 2.8 and 2.9. This resulted in a perimeter of 23.26° and an area 
of 30.86 square degrees, for a ratio of 0.75, relatively close to that of Wyoming.  The 
circularity measure is 0.717. 
 
Figure 2.3:  Circularity Measurement of New Mexico 
 
 States such as West Virginia, Maryland, and Maine are entirely different; many of 
their borders are highly irregular, which gives rise to the need to take more points for the 
formulas provided in Definitions 2.8 and 2.9. These shapes are very inefficient at 
enclosing area (similar to the open hand), thus their perimeter-to-area ratios will be far 
different from those of New Mexico and Wyoming. When these were used in Definitions 
2.8 and 2.9, it was found that West Virginia’s perimeter is 12.31°, and its area 6.24 
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square degrees, making a ratio of 1.97.  The circularity measure of West Virginia was 
calculated as 0.517, far different than both Wyoming and New Mexico.  The ratios used 
in this example were merely approximations; if every edge of a respective state was taken 
into account, this ratio would be much less efficient.  For this reason, Maine actually has 
the longest coastline of any of the lower 48 states.  The difference between Maine and 
West Virginia is that the source of the perimeter issue is a natural phenomenon in Maine, 
while West Virginia was a political construction from the Civil War era, forged from 
secession. 
 
Figure 2.4:  Circularity Measurement of West Virginia 
 
Gerrymandering  and disputed districts are often characterized with inefficiently-
shaped districts and high perimeter-to-area ratios; to explore this, the Euclidean distance 
formula and the shoelace formula were used to characterize the states. These concepts are 
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sometimes applied to congressional districts in an attempt to discover if it has been 
gerrymandered or not. Using the concept of shape and circularity in providing evidence 
for gerrymandering, as easy as it may be to see to the naked eye, is fraught with serious 
issues. It assumes that the shape of a district is the sole measure by which 
gerrymandering is accomplished; as discussed in later sections, this one-dimensional 
thinking cannot be used to fully understand the concepts of redistricting and 
gerrymandering. 
 Principle 2.5: Optimal geometry. As shown in the previous principle, straight 
lines are very efficient in containing area, giving it a low perimeter-to-area ratio. 
Knowing this, how is it possible to make an efficient district in a state such as Maine? 
The answer to this is simple; one must use the shortest lines possible to cut the state into 
areas of equal population. Figure 2.5 shows how rangevoting.org separated the state into 
equally populated districts.  
 
Figure 2.5: Rangevoting.org’s Straight-Line Districting of Maine (RangeVoting.org, 2012) 
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On larger states, the method stays the same. For a state with four possible 
districts, one would first find the shortest line that divides the state in half by population. 
The two halves would in turn be separated in two pieces using the shortest line possible. 
In a state with an odd number of districts, however, it is slightly more complicated. For a 
state with three possible districts, one would need to separate it into two pieces (one piece 
with 2/3 of the population, and the second with the rest). Then, the larger portion of the 
state would be divided in half by population, which would give the state approximately 
equal districts. This is theoretically the “best” way to draw districts in terms of 
compactness; it would reduce the impact of the entity that is drawing the district, as well 
as provide more regular-shaped districts. It has been noted that districts have become 
progressively less compact over the past sixty years (Ansolabehere and Palmer, 2015); 
does the range vote method provide a solution? However tempting it may be, this does 
not work in practice, as these lines would cut not only through towns and Census tracts, 
but through neighborhoods and houses. This approach assumed infinite flexibility in 
drawing districts, which is simply not the case. Districts are drawn using Census tracts (or 
blocks, where pertinent), and as such a district’s boundaries are limited by the boundaries 
of the Census tracts that share an edge with the district. This is comparable to trying to 
build a perfect circle (or any shape) with a selection of Lego bricks, and given the 
mandate to include a certain volume of bricks. While it may be possible to meet the 
volume requirement, one is limited to the shape of the respective bricks that are used in 
the process.  
 As we have seen, there are a plethora or mathematical principles that are 
necessary to understand before one can critically analyze the redistricting process. These 
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principles will help in finding gaps in the literature surrounding redistricting, and also aid 
in the formulation of a method to more effectively analyze gerrymandering 
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Literature 
Section 3 
 
Gerrymandering and its effects on the United States Congress have been studied 
from almost every angle in political science, including ethically, legally, and politically. 
The representational effects of gerrymandering are directly tied into representation under 
democratic theory, as institutions such as gerrymandering can disrupt stability that 
theorists consider critical for operation of a democratic republic. (Yoshinaka and Murphy 
2009).  
 Gerrymandering and the greater question of the effects of redistricting and 
apportionment on the makeup of the U.S. Congress and respective state legislatures has 
been the subject of a voluminous literature in political science and economics. 
Historically speaking, Mayhew’s highly influential studies regarding redistricting in 1972 
and 1974 inspired many studies in subsequent years that sought to understand the effects 
of redistricting on incumbency (Bullock 1975; Erikson 1972; Ferejohn 1977; Fowler, 
Douglass, and Clark 1980; Friedman 2009; Squire 1995; Tufte 1973). Further research 
sought to examine the advantage brought to a specific party if those drawing the district 
sought to advantage that party over another (Born 1985; Cain 1985; Glazer, Grofman, 
and Robbins 1987; King and Browning 1987; Swain, Borrelli, and Reed 1998).  
Moreover, Gelman and King (1994) noted that the redistricting process causes 
tremendous amounts of uncertainty, as partisan strategy can come into conflict with 
incumbency, with incumbent legislators who may not be victorious in the next election 
and seek to have a “safe” district.  
 The more recent literature surrounding redistricting and gerrymandering has been 
focused on whether or not polarization can be accurately explained by gerrymandering 
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(Abramowitz et al, 2006a, 2006b; Carson et al 2007; Gopoian and West 1984; McDonald 
2006; Seabrook 2010). These divergent studies provide correspondingly divergent 
conclusions, which can be seen as the side effect of vastly different methodological 
approaches. Earlier studies found in the literature seek to examine the effect of 
redistricting on the makeup of the House by studying the election results just before and 
just after a redistricting. While many of these studies found significant effects caused by 
redistricting, similar to the classic “chicken or the egg” question, the major flaw in this 
set of studies is that the temporal relation of redistricting and incumbency could not be 
ascertained, as the original districts may have been gerrymandered.  
 Other recent work in the realm of redistricting comes in the form of geometrical 
examinations of congressional districts in regards to the implications of compactness. It 
has been well noted in the literature that congressional districts have become 
considerably less compact in the past fifty years and longer (Hill, 2011; Ansolabehere 
and Palmer, 2015).  Most research in political science regarding congressional district 
compactness has come in the form of measuring the affects of varying levels of 
compactness on the voting population. There is seemingly a consensus in the literature 
that the shape of these districts effects voting knowledge, with voters in less compact 
districts showing reduced knowledge of voting and elected officials (Engstrom, 2002, and 
Hill, 2011). Beyond the impact of compactness on voting behavior, issues of 
compactness in the redistricting have often been raised in political discourse, and 
attempts have even been made to use such metrics as a way to measure gerrymandering 
(Graham, 2014). This research is conflicting, however, as some say researchers say that 
compactness inhibits gerrymandering (Hill, 2011) while others say the use of a 
compactness standard lowers minority representation (Barabas and Jerit, 2004). The use 
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of compactness measures as the main school of thought by which to engage the 
redistricting process has major flaws. Mathematically, the use of compactness to measure 
congressional districts is precarious at best. As shown in the mathematical background of 
this paper, the imposition of traditional geometric measures of compactness simply does 
not work as intended when placed against natural boundaries, such as rivers or coastlines. 
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that while compactness mandates are legally in force 
in many states, they are simply ignored in many instances (Thompson, 2002). As such, 
serious inquiry into gerrymandering and questions of representation surrounding 
congressional districts must go beyond the use of simple geometry in order to gain a 
deeper insight.    
 As the literature progressed and the identification revolution took hold, the goal of 
establishing an exogenous measure of baseline district-level partisanship became more 
common. These baselines have been established using presidential vote data 
(Abramowitz et al, 2006a) or from voter registration data (Cain, 1985).  While these 
studies were well-equipped to study the effects of a single redistricting scheme imposed 
on a specific area, they did not provide an adequate baseline of partisanship at the district 
level that could be used to study the partisan effects of redistricting. To accurately study 
the effects of redistricting, one would need to examine the partisan and demographic 
makeup of actual districts in a state in comparison to an adequately sized sampling of 
possible districts in a given state that fall within the population constraints imposed on 
the redistricting process. These samples would need to be aggregated and compared to 
actual districts using vote prediction methods. The results of this statistical comparison 
can then be used to provide evidence toward confirming or disputing that the current 
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redistricting process has had in impact on the makeup or partisanship of the U.S. House 
of Representatives.  
 Attempts at creating possible districts can be seen the form of studies conducted 
by Chenn and Rodden (2015) and McCarty et al (2009). In Chen and Rodden’s study, 
randomized districts were drawn using seed nodes that were expanded to fill an entire 
state with districts, which were then tested for partisanship. While this is an important 
start, their study only focused on the partisanship of Florida, and districts were allowed to 
have up to 5% difference in population, above the more commonly acceptable standard of 
approximately between 3% and 1% found in most states (Council, 2011 and Levitt, 
2015). Conversely, McCarty et al took a much different approach in their study on 
whether polarization in the U.S. House is caused by partisan gerrymandering. The most 
important critique for this paper is in the methodology used in obtaining randomized 
“districts” which were then combined with demographic data in order to predict a 
potentially victorious party, which was in turn used to obtain a polarization estimate 
using the NOMINATE system. In drawing these districts, they made several assumptions 
that are fraught with flaws. The first of these comes in the form of the data that they 
employed to create these districts; citing “data limitations” they used geographical data 
from the county level. This claim is spurious at best, as the data missing from the study 
have been available for over a decade from the U.S. Census Bureau and other sources. 
Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing, otherwise known as 
TIGER or TIGER/Line, is a file format that has been in use by the U.S. Census Bureau 
for over 20 years. As of 2008, these files have allowed users of Geographical Information 
System (GIS) software to observe and manipulate geographic (and combined 
demographic) data all the way down to the Census tract level, as well as to account for 
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geographic limitations such as rivers, lakes, bays, and coastline. The sizes of Census 
tracts vary depending on population density, with highly dense populations centers being 
conducive to having significantly more Census tracts. This allows a user to show accurate 
population distribution, thus giving the ability to conduct significantly more accurate 
simulations of potential congressional districts. This software and the expertise to use it 
are easily obtainable at many major universities, and the TIGER/Line shapefiles (.shp) 
are obtained at no cost from the U.S. Census Bureau’s website. In essence, this file 
format would have made their results significantly more accurate while adding a 
negligible amount of cost in terms or human or material resources. Furthermore, in order 
to construct these randomized districts, they subdivided counties into “1,000 person 
blocks, (and eliminate counties with lower populations).” This method is problematic in 
two different ways. The first is the authors’ idea that people can be arbitrarily separated 
into equally populated blocks, and in turn these blocks can be used to gain accurate 
results that explain real-world political behavior.  This is not the way people are 
distributed spatially in the real world; as one can see from a quick glance at Aroostook 
County, Maine, populations are not equally spaced out in any given county. In 
Aroostook, the largest county in the state of Maine in geographic terms, the population is 
almost exclusively centered on the border with Canada. The majority of the landmass is 
simply forest, and is considered unorganized territory by the state government. Any 
simulation assuming that Aroostook County is equally distributed would result in 
unpopulated areas having undue influence on the formation of districts, and would thus 
skew results. Similar circumstances would skew results in states such as New Mexico, 
Utah, and Nevada, where state populations are highly centralized around different points. 
Furthermore, another idea that was unnecessarily divergent from the real world system 
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that was being recreated came in the propensity to simply eliminate counties with lower 
populations from the randomized redistricting. While smaller counties may not have as 
significant a voice in congressional elections, simply disregarding them in simulations is 
undesirable on two levels. The first of these is the fact that rural areas tend to 
overwhelmingly favor the Republican Party; in fact, the only metropolitan areas that 
voted for Republican Mitt Romney in 2012 were Phoenix, Oklahoma City, Fort Worth, 
and Salt Lake City (Kron, 2012). While any given county that was eliminated by the 
authors may not have had a significant effect on the simulation by itself, the effect of 
removing the hundreds of smaller counties in the U.S. would have skewed the results of 
this simulation toward the Democratic side by an unknown percentage. A subsequent 
effect of this flaw is in the accuracy of such a method of drawing districts in reality. In 
drawing the congressional districts for any given state, the districts need to be jointly 
exhaustive and pairwise disjoint, meaning that all of a state must be represented in a 
district, and that no more than one district can occupy the same space. This method 
violates the spirit of this by simply removing whole counties in states because they do not 
meet a certain population parameter. This not only would affect the results of such a 
simulation by leaving votes out, but also violates the spirit of redistricting and the idea of 
one person, one vote. 
 In observing the literature, it is apparent that there needs to be a new approach in 
studying the effects of current redistricting practices on the makeup and polarization on 
the house of representatives. To overcome the methodological quirks in the literature, this 
new method must simultaneously provide a baseline by comparing actual districts and an 
adequate sample of possible districts in a state along with an aggregation and comparison 
of results, while also preserving proper spatial attributes that are found in the real world. 
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The method employed in this exercise accomplishes these goals, while also operating on 
a scale that allows us to compare the makeup of the entire U.S. House of Representatives 
to what should happen based on predictive methods, instead of being localized to a single 
delegation.  	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Methods and Materials 
Section 4 
 
To find the natural partisanship of each state’s congressional delegation if human 
bias was removed, three individual processes were carried out. These are detailed in 
subsections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.  
1. Section 4.1 describes the construction of a linear model using previous election 
results to predict voting behavior from demographic metrics at the congressional 
district level.  
2. Section 4.2 describes randomized “ad hoc” districts constructed using a 
connection algorithm over Census tracts.  
3. Section 4.3 describes how demographic data of the ad hoc districts were 
aggregated and compared to the results of the model, thus ascertaining the natural 
party makeup of a congressional delegation in any given state based on the 
assumptions of the model. 
Section 4.1. To find a predictive model for voting behavior in congressional districts, 
demographic data from the American Community Survery (ACS) were paired with 
Federal election results from the Clerk of the House to create a linear model in R (R Core 
Team, 2015). In this section, the data sources for this model are detailed (4.1.1) and the 
procedure for conducting the statistical analysis is recorded (4.1.2).  
Section 4.1.1. The data that were used in the linear model included American 
Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates for 2007-2011 and 2008-2012 (2007-2011 in 
the format of Census blocks; 2008-2012 in the format of Census tracts), congressional 
districts from the 2002 and 2012 redistricting plans in shapefile format (.shp), and 
election results for 2002-2014 from the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives. The 
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election results came in the form of Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. The demographic and 
spatial data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau on their website in the form of 
TIGER/Line files in ESRI shapefile format, at the Census tract level. This dataset was 
extracted in ArcMap.  The linear model compared the historic election results to their 
corresponding demographic data from the ACS.  
Section 4.1.2. For each election results spreadsheet, all Democratic and other 
liberal election results were deleted, and Republican votes for a given district were 
combined with other conservative parties (i.e. Constitution Party, Tea Party, Libertarian 
Party, etc.) so that the only results displayed in the spreadsheet were conservative ones. 
This was done in order to form a binary system that resembles the current environment of 
the House of Representatives (Gelman and King 1994). The decision whether a party was 
conservative or liberal came from a simple online search of that party’s policy platform; 
if it was shown to be conservative in nature, the voting results were aggregated with other 
conservative results. If a third party’s platform was deemed to be liberal, its results were 
deleted along with the results of the Democratic Party. This process was done for each 
election cycle; elections 2002-2010 and 2012-2014 were combined and placed into 
respective spreadsheets, due to the fact that they had unique congressional districts based 
upon two separate reapportionments after the 2000 and 2010 Censuses. Finally, districts 
that were found to be noncompetitive were removed from the dataset, which were defined 
as a districts that showed high margins of victory in favor of a single party (more than a 
75%) or consistently had uncontested elections. This was done for two reasons. The first 
reason is electoral strategy; these districts are often solidly partisan to one side of the 
political spectrum to such an extent that the opposing party puts little effort into elections 
in those districts (Stonecash, 1996 and La Raja, 2013). The second reason lies in 
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statistical reliability; these elections would suggest a high margin of victory due to 
outside variables (i.e. campaign resources, incumbency, etc.) for demographic 
combinations that may otherwise be more competitive, thus not only skewing the results 
but also allowing confounding variables that alter the reliability of the linear model.  
Once the two spreadsheets with satisfactory electoral results were completed, 
demographic data were derived from ACS TIGER/Line files. These data were aggregated 
and paired with the corresponding electoral results. While this was a very straightforward 
process for the 2012-2014 spreadsheet, it proved to be more difficult for the spreadsheet 
containing the 2002-2010 results. This was because the ACS data that were based upon 
the 2000 Census did not exist in a format delineated by congressional district, but instead 
was recorded in Census blocks. Using ArcMap, this was reformatted to fit congressional 
districts from the 2000 redistricting and reapportionment. In order to do this, the ACS 
was downloaded in geodatabase format in block delineation and overlaid with the 2000 
Congressional District ACS map. Using the dissolve tool from the ArcToolbox in 
ArcMap, the ACS blocks were collapsed into the proper congressional districts, and their 
values were aggregated within each district. This was done using the 2000 congressional 
district shapefile as the target, and selecting “dissolve by centroid.” This aggregated the 
ACS demographic data to the congressional district level by adding the demographic 
values of each block sharing a common feature (in this case congressional district 
affiliation), and removing the internal geometry. This process is illustrated in Figure 
4.1.1. Once this was complete, the newly aggregated demographic data were then joined 
over congressional district to the 2002-2010 election result spreadsheet.  
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Figure 4.1.1. Illustration of Dissolve Feature in ArcMap. Smaller units of the map from the input are 
collapsed into larger delineations in the output (ESRI, 2012) 
The issue with this process is that the blocks used in the ACS did not always line 
up directly with the borders of a given congressional district from the Census data layer. 
While Census blocks theoretically line up with congressional district borders, errors in 
spatial data entry and differences in map projection between the two datasets can change 
the topology. In order to create the most accurate representation of what the aggregated 
data would look like if it were prepared by the U.S. Census Bureau, blocks that did not 
line up directly inside the borders of a congressional district were assigned to the districts 
in which its centroid was located.  This operation is depicted in Figure 4.1.2, in which the 
green and blue counties are assigned to the circle. Once the demographic data were 
obtained for each district, the values were normalized. This was done by dividing the 
value of the demographic by that of the total popuation, leaving a number between 0 and 
1. This allowed a more accurate comparision between congressional districts of different 
states by providing the percentage of a given demographic in a given district rather than 
the number of people who identify as that demogrpahic. This is necessary to overcome 
the discrepensies in district size between different states; for example, comparing  the 
demographic makeup of districts with respective populations of 700,000 and 600,000 
	   33	  
would not be as wise as comparing districts with respective African American 
proportions of 22% and 83%.  
 
Figure 4.1.2. Illustration of “Dissolve by Centroid” Command in ArcMap using a radius. Green and blue 
are dissolved, and magenta is omitted. This particular instance shows all counties within a radius of 200 
miles of New Castle County, Deleware (Hanson, 2012) 
 Once the electoral data were aggregated and paired with corresponding 
demographic data, the model could then be constructed in R. In order to arrive at a linear 
model that was able to reliably predict election results, several trials were done to find the 
demographics that were shown to be significant indicators of congressional voting 
behavior. These selected demographics were regressed again, and the demographics that 
were found to be significant from this regression were included in the final model. The 
demographics that were selected for the final model included veteran status of those over 
18 years of age (B21001E2/B21001E1), females over 18 years of age ( 𝐵01001𝐸!!"!" )/
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( 𝐵01001𝐸!!"! + 𝐵01001𝐸!!"!" )), non-Hispanic black (B02009E1/B01001E1), 
married  over 18 years of age (B09019E7*2), management, business, science, and arts 
occupations over 25 years of age (C24010E3+C24010E39/ C24010E1), service 
occupations over 25 years of age (C24010E27+C24010E63/ C24010E1), natural 
resources, construction, and maintenance over 25 years of age (C24010E30+C24010E66/ 
C24010E1), educational achievement of a high school diploma or less for those over 25 
years of age ( 𝐵15003𝐸!!"! )/B15003E1, and educational achievement of an advanced 
degree for those over 25 years of age ( 𝐵15003𝐸!!"!" )/B15003E1). Each metric is a 
proportion normalized between 0 and 1 to correct for the difference in age levels for the 
various data sources. The model demonstrated a significant correlation (r = 0.6683, 
p<0.05). 
Table 4.1:  Baseline Linear Model for congressional District Candidate Preference based on American 
Community Survey Demographics 
Demographic Estimate Std. Error t Pr(>|t|) Significance 
(Intercept) 0.13 0.39 0.35 0.73  
Veteran % 0.48 0.25 1.91 0.06 . 
Female % -2.38 0.75 -3.18 <0.01 ** 
Black % 0.18 0.07 2.68 <0.01 ** 
Married % 1.24 0.14 9.12 <0.01 *** 
Management, Business, Science, and 
Arts Occupations % 1.04 0.29 3.57 <0.01 *** 
Service Occupations % 1.66 0.34 4.94 <0.01 *** 
Natural Resources, Construction, and 
Machinery % 1.12 0.35 3.16 <0.01 ** 
High School Diploma or Less % 0.27 0.10 2.74 0.01 ** 
Advanced Degree % -0.97 0.31 -3.13 <0.01 ** 
 
Significance Codes: 
 
‘***’ 0.001 
 
‘**’ 0.01 
 
‘*’ 0.05 
 
‘.’ 0.1  
Residual Standard Error: 0.1008 on 339 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.45 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.43 
F-Statistic: 30.4 Degrees of Freedom: N: 9  D:  339 p-value: <0.01 
 
Section 2.2 The next step was to draw 100 simulated congressional districts in each state. 
This process entailed the extraction of tract adjacency and population data from ArcMap 
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(4.2.1), randomization of districts using a randomization algorithm (4.2.2.1), and further 
creation of randomized districts using GPMetis (4.2.2.2).  
Section 4.2.1 First, connectivity and population data from the 2010 Census were 
extracted using ArcMap. Each state was extracted from the file and exported to a unique 
shapefile. This was done by using the “select by attribute” tool, utilizing the Federal 
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) code of each state as the target value. This 
process was repeated for each of the 43 states with more than one district. 
In each state file, the attribute table was opened. The FID (Feature I.D). and 
DP010001 (total population) fields were extracted to create a population vector for the set 
of tracts. For states with a coastline, coastal entities with a population of 0 were deleted 
from the attribute table. This was done to prevent complex partitions in the ad hoc 
districts and to preserve simply connected contiguous regions of interest (Dube et al, 
2015).  In essence, this prevented the connection algorithm from using water entities to 
connect Census tracts that are not geographically connected by land, effectively limiting 
each ad hoc district to a single polygon in both virtual space and geographically. This 
table was then exported in the attribute table window. This process was repeated for each 
of the 43 states with more than one district. 
 
Figure 4.2.1. Illustration of point connectivity between tract A and tract B.  
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Next, Census tract connectivity was obtained using the “polygon neighbors” tool. 
This was done in the ArcToolbox by selecting Analysis tools<Proximity<Polygon 
Neighbors. In the Polygon Neighbors table, the “FID” field was selected, “Include both 
sides of neighbor relationship” was deselected, and the output linear unit was set to miles. 
Once this operation was complete, the new table was added to the map. The “Select by 
Attributes” tool was then used to select all entries with a node count of one, which were 
subsequently deleted. This was done to eliminate the direct connectivity relationships of 
Census tracts that demonstrated only point connectivity (Dube et al, 2015). As shown in 
Figure 4.2.1, tracts that are point connected do not share a border, and violate the spirit of 
the contiguity constraint imposed on congressional districts. Once the selected entries 
were deleted from the table, the entire table was exported to a .txt file. This textfile 
represents the adjacency between tracts for the state, a mereotopological map.  
In previous work, a technical constraint forced the removal of island entities from the 
dataset and subsequent simulated districts, as islands are inherently disconnected 
(McCarty et al, 2012). The methodology employed in this exercise overcomes this 
obstacle through the manipulation of the previously exported adjacency text files to 
denote adjacency between one Census tract on the island and one on the mainland. This 
process is illustrated in Figure 4.2.2. While these additions to the adjacency lists were 
simple to execute, choosing which Census tracks to connect to islands proved to be more 
challenging. In order to do this, Google’s online mapping application Google Maps was 
used to determine the location of ferry terminals that service the island (Google, 2014). A 
ferry route is denoted on Google Maps using a dashed line connecting a ferry terminal to 
the island which the ferry provides service to. The corresponding Census tract was 
identified in ArcMap, and the adjacency list for the state was modified to denote 
	   37	  
connectivity between the Census tract corresponding to the ferry terminal on the island 
and the Census tract in which the ferry terminal is located on the mainland. This method 
was chosen because ferry services are the greatest form of connectivity between distant 
islands and the mainland.  
This method was utilized to account for the Virginia section of the Delmarva 
Peninsula. Due to a multiplicity of ferry crossings, the peninsula was connected to the 
mainland of Virginia at the closest geographic point, as measured by ArcMap. This was 
used in order to prevent a “bridge gap,” in which the connectivity algorithm connects two 
disjoint Census tracts on the mainland by using their mutually connected point (in this 
case the peninsula), as a bridge. In the case of connecting the Upper Peninsula of 
Michigan, the Census tracts at either end of the Mackinaw Bridge were connected in the 
prescribed manner, as the bridge can be assumed to be the most commonly used form of 
transportation between the two parts of the state. In Maine, Michigan, Rhode Island, and 
several others states, the U.S. Census Bureau had already denoted connectivity between 
islands and the mainland by including an island and a part of the mainland in a single 
Census tract.   
 
Figure 4.2.2. Illustration of imposed connectivity between an island (tract A) and the mainland (tract C) 
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Section 4.2.2. Once the population vector and proper adjacency list were obtained 
for each state, randomized ad hoc districts could be drawn.  This was done in two ways. 
The Monte Carlo method is discussed in 2.2.2.1, and GPMetis is discussed in 4.2.2.2. 
Section 4.2.2.1. To create randomized districts initially, a connection algorithm 
was commissioned. This program drew randomized ad hoc districts within 1% population 
of each other in a given state using a Monte Carlo method. The Monte Carlo method uses 
repeated random sampling to find a certain numerical result (Kroese et al, 2014). In this 
exercise, the Monte Carlo method entailed choosing a Census tract from the graph at 
random, connecting adjacent Census tracts until a population ceiling is reached, and 
repeating this process until a set of jointly exhaustive, pairwise disjoint (JEPD) subgraphs 
utilizing every Census tract was completed on a given state.   
 
 
Figure 4.2.3 Sample redistricting output for Utah and Corresponding Illustration 
This algorithm operates as follows. For each state, there are k subdivisions to be 
created, one for each congressional district assigned to that state.  Initially, all Census 
tract are unassigned.  The program picks k seed nodes that are separated by at least one 
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node (i.e. not adjacent), using these to start each district. Nodes that are unassigned, and 
adjacent to the subgraph with the lowest population, are added to that subgraph.  If the 
lowest-population subgraph has no available unassigned neighbors, nodes are swapped 
into that subgraph from the neighboring subgraph with the highest population.  Nodes are 
added in this way until none are left unassigned (Robertson, 2015). 
Then, three processes occur – 
1. Nodes in large population subgraphs are swapped out into the adjacent 
subgraphs, as long as they do not decrease the population of the subgraph 
initiating the swap below the size of the lowest population subgraph.  
2. Nodes are swapped into small population subgraphs from surrounding 
subgraphs, as long as they do not increase the destination subgraph beyond the 
size of the largest subgraph.   
3. The third process randomly swaps nodes between adjacent subgraphs; this 
happens more rarely than the other two and is used to avoid a state where 
nodes cannot swap due to the weight (population) of the nodes. 
Once the code was allowed to create 100 iterations of ad hoc districts, it gave a 
uniquely named output text file for each iteration. When opened, these files contained a 
list with two columns; the Census tract FID is found in the left column, and the “district” 
that it was assigned to is found on the right. Districts are numbered 0 to x, with x being 
the number of districts in a given state minus one. Utah was arbitrarily chosen to be the 
first state to be checked for geographic irregularities using ArcMap. This is illustrated in 
Figure 4.2.3, which is a screen shot of the first 25 Census tracts and their assigned 
“districts.” Note that there are four districts in Utah, shown in the output as being 
numbered zero to three. In order to check for any irregularities in the process, the first 
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state that was redistricted using the code had the output from each iteration illustrated 
using ArcMap, which is also illustrated in Figure 4.2.4. Since there were no irregularities 
in the 100 iterations of Utah, this step was not done again for reasons of time. Once this 
was complete, the linear model could then be employed in order to predict the winning 
party for those simulated districts. 
 
 
Figure 4.2.4. All 99 subsequent iterations of Utah.  
 
Section 4.2.2.2. While the Monte Carlo method was able to provide randomized 
ad hoc districts, it was only able to successfully execute this process on 38 of the 43 
states that needed to be randomized for this project. The algorithm had problems with 
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states with many Census tracts, as well as states that had few connections. The states that 
it was unable to operate on are New York, California, Florida, Texas, and Hawai’i. This 
was due to the fact that it was splitting the graph to such a degree as was not reconcilable 
through the 2-1 swaps between districts. Tracts that split the graph are known as 
articulation points, and the result of their selection resulted in the swapping process to 
continue in perpetuity, as there was no swap that could solve the issue. Splits in the graph 
occur in larger states because there are more opportunities to split the graph due to a 
larger number of Census tracts to choose from. The articulation point issue is illustrated 
in Figure 4.2.5, where the selection of one of the unassigned nodes (yellow) cuts off the 
rest of the unassigned nodes, denoted in white. Furthermore, articulation points occur in 
Hawai’i because the geometry of the state with connectivity imposed on it, which 
resembles a single line; randomly choosing a tract in the graph has a greater than normal 
likelihood to cause a split in the graph. To address this issue, a new logic for creating 
randomized districts was needed. A solution to this problem was found in the form of 
GPMetis, a graph partitioning algorithm invented by the Karypis Lab at the University of 
Minnessota in 1998.  
GPMetis works in a similar fashion to the commissioned Monte Carlo method, 
but without some of the logical flaws that crippled Monte Carlo. It works as follows 
(Karypis, et al, 1999):  
1. Assigns all Census tracts to random contiguous districts, minimizing the number 
of connections between each district.  
2. To balance out the population, the code traded tracts between districts to balance 
population the population in each.   
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3. It continues to swap tracts until it reaches contiguous districts that are within 1% 
population of each other. These trades happen under the condition that either 
swap cannot split its original subgraph.  
 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
Figure 4.2.5. Illustration of an articulation point (in yellow) interfering in the creation of ad hoc districts 
using the Monte Carlo method by splitting the graph. This problem was common and gave rise to the need 
for GPMetis.  
This process has several benefits in comparison to the original method employed 
in this exercise. First, all trades between ad hoc districts were done under the condition 
that such a trade could not be made if it would separate the graph. This was important not 
only in the fact that it allowed the trades to continue, but it is also important because it 
worked to minimize the amount of connections between districts. In essence, this created 
more compact districts that were seen in the previous method, while preserving the 
validity of the randomization and automation process. Furthermore, this process was very 
efficient. A single iteration of Illinois took over 25 minutes on average using the original 
code on its 3,123 Census tracts. Using GPMetis, however, all 100 iterations of California 
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(8,057 Census tracts) took less than one minute. This change in efficiency saved a 
considerable amount of time on this exercise. One of the iterations of California using 
GPMetis can be seen in Figure 4.2.6, which can be compared to the current districts of 
California, as seen in Figure 4.2.7.   
Section 2.3. In the final step, the demographic data of these ad hoc districts were 
aggregated and compared to the results of the model, which ascertained the natural party 
makeup of a congressional delegation in any given state based on the assumptions of the 
model. First, Java 1.6.0 was used to aggregate the demographic data for the ad hoc 
districts from the Census tract level, adding up the data from each Census tract within a 
given ad hoc district. This process utilized the demographics prescribed by the linear 
model. The newly aggregated districts were subsequently compared to the linear model 
using Java 1.6.0, producing results that showed how these simulated districts would vote 
based on the assumptions of the linear model. 
Once this method was carried out on each of the states with more than one 
district, the results could then be aggregated and analyzed in order to gain more insight 
into the impact of current redistricting methods on the partisan makeup of the U.S. House 
of Representatives.  
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Figure 4.2.6. One of the Iterations of California Using GPMetis. Note the relative compactness of the 
districts 
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Figure 4.2.7. Current congressional Districts of California.  
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Results 
Section 5 
 
After the linear model was created using the ACS data and corresponding electoral 
results and the ad hoc districts were drawn according to the methods detailed in Section 
2, the model was then applied to each of the 100 ad hoc districts for each state with 
multiple seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. Table 5.1 displays the results of each 
state being projected for the winning party, and then compiled for a total amount of 
conservative representatives in each state’s delegation. It is delineated by the method in 
which a given state draws its districts; these methods include Republican control, 
Democratic control, mixed party control, independent commission, a court ordered 
process, and states that are currently under litigation. These monikers are defined for the 
purposes of this project as follows:  
1. Republican Control- Describes states that draw and approve their districts 
through a process that is controlled by the Republican Party. This can come in the 
form of a majority control over legislatively appointed redistricting commissions, 
governor-appointed redistricting commissions, processes that exist entirely within 
the scope of a Republican controlled-state government, or other situations in 
which Republicans have control of the redistricting process.  
2. Democratic Control- Describes states that draw and approve their districts 
through a process that is controlled by the Democratic Party. This can come in the 
form of a majority control over legislatively appointed redistricting commissions, 
governor-appointed redistricting commissions, processes that exist entirely within 
the scope of a Democratic party controlled-state government, or other situations in 
which Democrats have control of the redistricting process.  
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3. Mixed Control- Describes states in which there is no single party in control of 
the redistricting process form start to finish. This can come in the form of a split 
in the party makeup of individual houses in a given legislature, a split in the party 
of the legislature and the governor, or in other instances where a redistricting plan 
must pass through multiple institutions under different party control.  
4. Court Ordered Process- Describes states that were redistricted through one of 
the aforementioned processes, and subsequently had all or part of their 
redistricting plan nullified on legal grounds. These states then had districts drawn 
either by the court itself or by the regular process under court supervision or 
objective standards laid out by the court, such as population discrepancies 
between districts or demographic requirements.  
5.  Results Under Litigation- Describes states that have districts that are currently 
disputed in the legal system.  In Maryland,  an appeal was won at the Supreme 
Court to overturn a lower court ruling which allowed the districts to stand 
(Shapiro, 2015).  The question of the districts themselves was not settled by the 
case. In the instance of North Carolina, the 1st and 12th districts were ruled 
unconstitutional because they packed African American voters into districts. The 
state’s districts are being redrawn as of this writing, and new districts have yet to 
be approved.  
 
For the purposes of this study, it should be noted that a higher percentage of states 
that underwent redistricting through a Republican controlled process are shown to be 
significant in comparison to states that were under Democratic control or are overseen by 
an independent commission. One intriguing observation that can be made through these 
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data is that states under mixed redistricting control are slightly more likely to be 
significant than those states that are under Republican control.  
Table 5.1 shows a large amount of states with delegations that fall outside of the 
bounds of the simulation, much more than expected. With this in mind, the model was 
tested against the delegations of the 113th Congress, the final congressional election 
included in the training set. The model established a major democratic shift (on the order 
of 275-160), meaning that the linear model itself seems to lean toward the Democratic 
party. The results of this analysis may be seen in Table 5.3. One major consideration that 
may have affected this outcome was in regards to the intercept term; due to the fact that 
the data set used corrected for incumbent representatives and noncompetitive elections 
(as defined in Section 4), the intercept term of the model may not serve as the most 
reliable term. This is discussed in the next section.   
It was clear that due to the Democratic leaning nature of the model, the model 
needed to be revamped. Two metrics were considered for reanalysis:  (1) balanced error 
(conservative errors and liberal errors identical) and (2) total error minimized.  This 
minimal balance point was found to be at +4%, which is very consistent with literature 
concerning the effect of religion on voting behavior, which was not incorporated into this 
model due to lack of useable data (Layman 1997), which is also discussed in the next 
section. Table 5.2 shows the results of the analysis at this modified benchmark (46%) on 
a state-to-state level. 
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Table 5.1:  Analysis of Each State Against its Simulations.  States within one seat are denoted with #, while 
states outside of one seat are denoted by *. 
Republican 
Control 
State Average SD LL UL Actual Z P Significant? 
AL 2.39 0.86 0.7 4.08 6 4.2 <0.01 * 
AR 2.24 0.51 1.23 3.25 4 3.45 <0.01 # 
GA 4.78 0.97 2.88 6.68 10 5.38 <0.01 * 
FL 7.45 1.08 5.83 10.06 17 8.84 <0.01 * 
IN 0.93 0.78 -0.6 2.46 7 7.78 <0.01 * 
LA 2.1 0.82 0.49 3.71 5 3.54 <0.01 * 
MI 2.57 0.81 0.99 4.15 9 7.94 <0.01 * 
NH 1.43 0.5 0.45 2.41 1 -0.86 0.28 
 OH 2.61 1.03 0.58 4.64 12 9.12 <0.01 * 
OK 3.47 0.61 2.27 4.67 5 2.51 0.02 # 
SC 0.72 0.62 -0.5 1.94 6 8.52 <0.01 * 
TN 4.86 0.85 3.19 6.53 7 2.52 0.02 # 
TX 18.29 1.45 15.26 21.31 25 4.34 <0.01 * 
UT 3.61 0.49 2.65 4.57 4 0.8 0.29 
 WI 4.2 0.82 2.6 5.8 5 0.98 0.25 
 Democratic Control 
State Average SD LL UL Actual Z P Significant? 
IL 4.17 0.97 2.26 6.08 8 3.95 <0.01 * 
KY 2.38 0.9 0.62 4.14 5 2.91 0.01 # 
MA 0.07 0.26 -0.43 0.57 0 -0.27 0.38 
 OR 0.69 0.63 -0.55 1.93 1 0.49 0.38 
 RI 0 0 0 0 0 -- -- 
 WV 2.24 0.45 1.35 3.13 3 1.69 0.1 
 Mixed Control 
State Average SD LL UL Actual Z P Significant? 
HI     0    
MO 4.18 0.77 2.67 5.69 6 2.36 0.02 # 
NJ 2.32 0.87 0.61 4.03 6 4.23 <0.01 * 
NY 1.06 0.6 -0.12 2.24 9 13.23 <0.01 * 
PA 6.7 1.37 4.02 9.38 13 4.6 <0.01 * 
WA 4.27 1.01 2.28 6.26 4 -0.27 0.39 
 Independent Commission 
State Average SD LL UL Actual Z P Significant? 
AZ 3.46 0.87 1.76 5.16 5 1.77 0.08 
 CA 5.3 1.10 3.133 7.47 14 7.9 <0.01 * 
ID 2 0 2 2 2 -- -- 
 IA 2.47 0.54 1.41 3.53 3 0.98 0.25 
 ME 0.93 0.26 0.43 1.43 1 0.27 0.38 
 Court Ordered Process 
State Average SD LL UL Actual Z P Significant? 
CO (M) 3.37 0.8 1.8 4.94 4 0.79 0.29 
 CT (M) 0 0 0 0 0 -- -- 
 KS (R) 2.12 0.61 0.93 3.31 4 3.08 <0.01 # 
MN (D) 5.15 0.69 3.8 6.5 3 -3.12 <0.01 # 
MS (R) 0.06 0.24 -0.41 0.53 3 12.25 <0.01 * 
NV (R) 0.05 0.22 -0.38 0.48 3 13.41 <0.01 * 
NM (D) 0.01 0.1 -0.19 0.21 1 9.9 <0.01 # 
VA* (R) 4.41 0.92 2.6 6.22 8 3.9 <0.01 * 
Results Under Litigation 
State Average SD LL UL Actual Z P Significant? 
MD (D) 1.99 0.8 0.43 3.55 1 -1.24 0.19 
 NC (R) 2.98 1.07 0.88 5.08 10 6.56 <0.01 * 
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Table 5.2:  Analysis of Each State Against its Simulations, Incorporating a +4% Balance Point.  States 
within one seat are denoted with #, while states outside of one seat are denoted by *. 
Republican 
Control 
State Average SD LL UL Actual Z P Significant? 
AL 4.51 0.61 3.31 5.71 6 2.44 0.01 # 
AR 3.65 0.48 2.71 4.59 4 0.73 0.23 
 GA 8.1 0.85 6.44 9.76 10 2.24 0.01 # 
FL 15.13 1.23 12.72 17.54 17 1.52 0.064  
IN 4.2 0.94 2.35 6.05 7 2.98 <0.01 # 
LA 3.61 0.69 2.25 4.97 5 2.01 0.02 # 
MI 5.2 0.91 3.42 6.98 9 4.18 <0.01 * 
NH 1.99 0.1 1.79 2.19 1 -9.9 <0.01 # 
OH 6.98 1.21 4.6 9.36 12 4.15 <0.01 * 
OK 4.88 0.33 4.24 5.52 5 0.36 0.36 
 SC 3.29 0.76 1.81 4.77 6 3.57 <0.01 * 
TN 6.9 0.7 5.52 8.28 7 0.14 0.44 
 TX 23.14 1.41 20.37 25.91 25 1.319 0.18  
UT 3.92 0.27 3.39 4.45 4 0.3 0.38 
 WI 5.5 0.64 4.24 6.76 5 -0.78 0.22 
 Democratic Control 
State Average SD LL UL Actual Z P Significant? 
IL 9.13 0.99 7.19 11.07 8 -1.14 0.13 
 KY 5.15 0.56 4.06 6.24 5 -0.27 0.39 
 MA 0.64 0.58 -0.49 1.77 0 -1.1 0.13 
 OR 2.18 0.64 0.92 3.44 1 -1.84 0.03 
 RI 0 0 0 0 0 -- -- 
 WV 2.98 0.2 2.59 3.37 3 0.1 0.46 
 Mixed Control 
State Average SD LL UL Actual Z P Significant? 
HI 0.04 0.19 -0.35 0.42 0 0.21 0.83  
MO 5.51 0.54 4.45 6.57 6 0.91 0.18 
 NJ 5.38 0.91 3.61 7.16 6 0.68 0.25 
 NY 4.94 0.80 3.37 6.51 9 5.07 <0.01 * 
PA 11.3 1.02 9.3 13.3 13 1.67 0.05  WA 7.36 0.77 5.85 8.87 4 -4.36 <0.01 * 
Independent Commission 
State Average SD LL UL Actual Z P Significant? 
AZ 4.93 0.66 3.65 6.21 5 0.11 0.46  CA 10.7 1.16 8.43 12.97 14 2.844 <0.01 * 
ID 2 0 2 2 2 -- -- 
 IA 3.69 0.53 2.66 4.72 3 -1.3 0.1 
 ME 1.93 0.26 1.43 2.43 1 -3.58 <0.01 # 
Court Ordered Process 
State Average SD LL UL Actual Z P Significant? 
CO (M) 4.73 0.65 3.46 6 4 -1.12 0.13 
 CT (M) 0.12 0.33 -0.52 0.76 0 -0.36 0.36 
 KS (R) 3.52 0.54 2.46 4.58 4 0.89 0.19 
 MN (D) 5.96 0.57 4.61 7.07 3 -5.19 <0.01 * 
MS (R) 1.24 0.49 0.27 2.21 3 3.59 <0.01 # 
NV (R) 1.36 0.52 0.34 2.38 3 3.15 <0.01 # 
NM (D) 0.25 0.44 -0.6 1.1 1 1.7 0.04 
 VA* (R) 7.4 0.82 5.8 9 8 0.73 0.23 
 Results Under Litigation 
State Average SD LL UL Actual Z P Significant? 
MD (D) 3.35 0.77 1.84 4.86 1 -3.05 <0.01 # 
NC (R) 6.98 1.07 4.88 9.08 10 2.82 <0.01 # 
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Table 5.3:  Classification of 113th Congress by State using the Adjusted Model 
 
Overall Benchmarks                                                            Party Breakdown 
State Districts Correct Wrong Bad (+/- 4%) R to R D to D R to D D to R Offset 
AL 7 7 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 
AK 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
AZ 9 9 0 0 4 5 0 0 0 
AR 4 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 
CA 53 46 7 2 11 35 4 3 1 
CO 7 6 1 0 4 2 0 1 -1 
CT 5 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 
DE 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
FL 27 22 5 3 14 8 3 2 1 
GA 14 14 0 0 9 5 0 0 0 
HI 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
ID 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
IL 18 16 2 1 5 11 1 1 0 
IN 9 7 2 0 5 2 2 0 2 
IA 4 3 1 1 2 1 0 1 -1 
KS 4 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 
KY 6 5 1 1 4 1 1 0 1 
LA 6 6 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 
ME 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 2 -2 
MD 8 7 1 1 1 6 0 1 -1 
MA 9 9 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 
MI 14 12 2 0 7 5 2 0 2 
MN 8 5 3 2 3 2 0 3 -3 
MS 4 4 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 
MO 8 8 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 
MT 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
NE 3 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
NV 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 
NH 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 -2 
NJ 12 10 2 0 5 5 1 1 0 
NM 3 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 
NY 27 19 8 3 2 17 4 4 0 
NC 13 11 2 1 8 3 1 1 0 
ND 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
OH 16 11 5 1 7 4 5 0 5 
OK 5 4 1 0 4 0 1 0 1 
OR 5 3 2 1 1 2 0 2 -2 
PA 18 18 0 0 13 5 0 0 0 
RI 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
SC 7 5 2 0 4 1 2 0 2 
SD 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
TN 9 9 0 0 7 2 0 0 0 
TX 36 29 7 2 20 9 4 3 1 
UT 4 3 1 1 3 0 0 1 -1 
VT 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
VA 11 10 1 0 7 3 1 0 1 
WA 10 7 3 1 4 3 0 3 -3 
WV 3 2 1 1 2 0 0 1 -1 
WI 8 7 1 0 5 2 0 1 -1 
WY 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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Conclusion 
Section 6 
 As can be discerned by the data, there are a plethora of states that have 
congressional delegations that do not conform to the bounds suggested by the randomized 
redistricting plans. These are California, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, South 
Carolina, and Washington all currently fall outside of the expected delegations (MI, OH, 
SC, CA, and NY with more conservative delegations; MN and WA with more liberal 
delegations). Of these states Michigan, Ohio, and South Carolina underwent Republican-
controlled redistricting. In the mixed- control category, Washington and New York were 
the only states to have delegation that was significantly skewed by more than one seat. 
Interestingly, Minnesota was the only court-ordered redistricting plan that was shown to 
be significant through more than one seat according to the model. Furthermore, Alabama, 
Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, Maryland, Maine, and North Carolina are 
also significantly skewed, but fall within the next seat to be awarded, which can be 
interpreted as either significant or not based on the reader’s interpretation. These states 
also went through varying processes. Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Indiana 
underwent redistricting through a Republican-controlled process, Missouri and Nevada 
used a court-ordered process, and Maryland and North Carolina are currently under 
litigation. Maine was the only state that had its districts drawn through an independent 
process that was shown to be significant by the model. The illustration of each state’s 
status according to the model is detailed in Figure 6.1.  
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Figure 6.1. State Status based on Current Delegation and Simulations. Sig R/D means that a 
state’s delegation is significantly biased toward that party according to the model. Last Seat R/D means 
that a state is significant, but only by one seat. Lean R/D means that a state is leaning toward a certain 
party, but is not significant. Neutral/One Seat means that the model predicts the actual delegation, or there 
is only one seat in a particular state.  
Of particular interest is the distribution of the states amongst various methods of 
organizational redistricting control.  By subdividing the states amongst control groups, it 
was found that Republican-controlled redistricting processes tend to gain a much larger 
advantage for their party (Table 5.2; Figure 6.2).  Eight of the 15 Republican controlled 
states had significant outputs, with only NH producing a biased result favoring the 
Democratic Party.  For all other classifications, only nine of the remaining 27 states 
produced a significant result.  Five of the 17 significant states are skewed toward the 
liberal party, while the other twelve are skewed toward the conservative party.  
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Figure 6.2. Differences between actual and predicted seats by redistricting type.  
Now that the data at the state level have been examined, we can start to answer 
the ultimate question of this exercise; does the Republican Party gain a significant 
advantage due to current redistricting practices? The first method used answer this 
question came in the form of a z score taken from the current number of Republicans in 
the U.S. House in comparison to the number predicted using the model. This was found 
to be significant (p<0.001).  This is detailed in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1. Significance of Current Makeup of Congress 
Actual R  Random PR SD Z Score P Value Significant? 
247 221.57 4.71 5.39 <0.01 * 
  
 While it may be surprising that the Republican majority is significant to that large 
of a confidence interval, it may be the wrong statistical analysis to use for this exercise. 
This large difference between the actual and predicted Republican representation could 
be due to a plethora of issues which cannot be separated from the redistricting process, as 
is necessary for this exercise. In order to do this, two statistical analyses must be 
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executed. These are a comparison of the randomized redistricting to the balancing point 
in the U.S. House, and a comparison of the current redistricting map to the randomized 
redistricting schemes. These two processes serve to isolate the redistricting process from 
confounding variables, allowing us to have a better measure of significance for this 
exercise.  This is shown in Table 6.2.  
Table 6.2. Significance of the Randomized Districts and Current Districts According to the Model.  
 
Predicted R SD HBalance Z Score P Value Significant? 
Random Districts 221.57 4.71 217.5 0.86 0.39 
 Current Map 234 4.71 221.57 2.64 <0.01 * 
 
The second statistical analysis that was executed on the national data sought to 
provide evidence to answer whether or not the map of the United States has a natural 
tendency to favor the Republican Party. This was done by finding the z score of the 
randomized districts in comparison to the balance point of number of representatives 
needed to hold a majority in the U.S. House. As shown in Table 6.2, the map of the 
United States does not significantly benefit the Republican Party with an unbiased 
redistricting process. Once this was established, the most important statistical analysis of 
this study could be asked; does the current redistricting map significantly benefit the 
Republican Party in the U.S. House of Representatives? To find evidence to help answer 
this question, the z score of the current map as predicted with the model in comparison to 
the results of the randomized redistricting as predicted by the model was found. This was 
found to be significant. As such, the null hypothesis is rejected; the current congressional 
districts are found to significantly benefit the Republican Party more than is likely by a 
random map of districts according to the linear model.  
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Now that we have evidence to suggest that Republicans benefit significantly from 
current redistricting practices, further analysis was warranted. Why do Republicans 
seemingly benefit from current redistricting practices on an aggregate level? There are at 
least two possible explanations that could help to account for this phenomenon that can 
be explored further: the current control of the House of Representatives, a potential bias 
that would inherently lend toward increased conservative control based on midterm 
elections, and the spatial clustering of the Democratic party in urban areas (and 
corresponding geographic dispersion of the Republican party).  
The first explanation is seemingly straightforward; with the powerful effects of 
incumbency being documented extensively in political science literature, it is intuitive 
that these effects create a boost for the Republican Party, especially following 
overwhelming victories in each of the midterm elections since 2010. While this may 
seem fairly simple, it may be indicative of a greater trend in partisanship toward 
conservatism in the United States. This is not only seen in the perennial majority in the 
House of Representatives as of late, but in the first Republican majority in the U.S. 
Senate since the George W. Bush administration. Furthermore, a powerful indicator of 
national partisanship can lie in state legislatures, which use house and senate districts 
much smaller than is seen on the national level. As of late, a major wave in conservative 
partisanship can be seen in the state level, as the party has gained over 900 state 
legislative seats since 2009 (Pew, 2016). Currently, the Republican Party controls 68 out 
of 98 state legislative chambers and have control of both houses in 30 states, accounting 
for the largest majority in legislative chambers in the history of the party.  The party also 
currently controls both legislative chambers and the governorship simultaneously in 23 
states. Control of state legislatures since 2000 is illustrated in Figure 6.5.  When 
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combined with incumbency in the House and control over the redistricting process in 
states where districts are drawn by the legislature, Republican control over state houses 
and general partisanship of the U.S. may heavily influence the partisan makeup of the 
House as shown in this study.  
 
Figure 6.5. Number of State Legislatures Controlled by Party, by Number of Chambers. Nebraska is a 
unicameral non-partisan legislature, and is excluded. Data Source: National Conference of State 
Legislatures 
 The second possible cause for this Republican advantage in the House due to 
redistricting methods comes in the form of a spatial distribution advantage. While it has 
been well established that urban areas have densely packed liberal populations and rural 
areas in the United States are overwhelmingly dominated by low-density conservative 
populations (McKee, 2008), the impact of this distribution on the redistricting process has 
not been explored in depth. This spatial distribution of partisanship impacts the 
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redistricting process (and by extension, the partisan makeup of the U.S. House) in two 
ways.  The first way is in how metropolitan areas are distributed, with a dense city proper 
surrounded by suburban bedroom communities, which tend to be less populated, 
wealthier, and more conservative than the city proper (Chinn, 2014). This is conducive to 
cracking the more liberal city proper, and grouping it with more conservative suburban 
areas.  This particular spatial clustering problem can easily be demonstrated by observing 
Columbus, Ohio (Figure 6.6).  Columbus, Ohio is a city that has had a Democratic mayor 
since 2000, yet the congressional districts that are attached to this city are all 
conservatively-held at the current time and have been since that same time as well.  The 
suburban area surrounding Columbus is highly conservative, lending toward a three-seat 
cracking of the Democratic surplus in this region.   
 
 
Figure 6.6:  Columbus, Ohio, split between districts 3, 12, and 15.(National Atlas, 2015) 
	   59	  
But why does that benefit the Republican Party, and why cannot it be turned 
around to crack conservative suburbs using the liberal city proper? The answer to this lies 
in the second part of the clustering issue, which is the difference between Census tract 
layouts in a city versus those in a rural area.  Essentially, drawing a district is making a 
series of choices in regards to picking which Census tracts to include in which districts. 
Gerrymandering takes this to an extreme, picking Census tracts to meet certain 
demographic and partisan trends based on various predictive models of voting behavior. 
Essentially, redistricting requires that one Census tract is chosen over a different Census 
tract, many times. This benefits the Republican Party not because liberals tend to live in 
cities and conservatives tend to live in more rural areas, but instead the interaction 
between the partisanship and relative densities of these different areas in terms of Census 
tracts. Census tracts roughly contain between 1,200 and 8,000 people, with the ideal 
population of 4,000 people. This means that heavily populated, liberal areas area tightly 
packed with many small Census tracts, while less densely populated, conservative areas 
have much larger Census tracts to meet this constraint laid down by the Census bureau. 
This means that when a Republican redistricting entity is drawing congressional districts 
in such a way as to crack a liberal area, as is the case in Figure 6.6, there are more 
options and combinations of tracts in which this is possible. Conversely, it is more 
difficult for Democrat controlled redistricting entities to crack conservative areas due to 
the fact that there are many fewer Census tracts from which to choose. Essentially, the 
accuracy and precision in which the two sides can draw districts to their advantage is 
very lopsided; where the Republican are able to carve districts with a scalpel, the 
Democrats are left to carve districts with an axe. This can be seen by looking at 
Philadelphia, PA and the state of Maine, each with a comparable number of Census tracts 
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(Figure 6.7).  Maine’s tracts are much larger in most instances, making it more difficult to 
create compact shapes by picking and choosing whereas in Philadelphia, this is much 
easier to accomplish insofar as more options are present. 
 
   
    A    B         C 
Figure 6.7: (A) Census tracts of Philadelphia, PA (142.6 sq. miles, 383 Census tracts, 1.5M population) 
and the state of Maine (B and C) (35,385 sq. miles, 358 Census tract, 1.3M population (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2016). Maine (B) is the proposed redistricting from the Republican party in 2011, while Maine (C) 
is the proposed redistricting of the Democratic Party in 2011. (Russell, 2011) 
 Does this prove that gerrymandering has significantly skewed the partisan 
makeup of the U.S. house of Representatives? The answer to this is no. What this 
exercise proves is that according to the linear model employed in this particular instance, 
some states are shown to have redistricting schemes that send delegations to Congress 
that are not likely to have existed by chance. The only way to prove that gerrymandering 
happened would be to not only demonstrate that a state’s delegation is significant, but to 
establish intent. As such, the problem with claiming to prove gerrymandering is twofold; 
proving that a redistricting plan is significant, while also proving that the organization or 
person that drew the redistricting plan did so with the intention to benefit one political 
party to the detriment of another. The first part of this problem is inherently impossible; 
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one cannot prove anything using statistical methods, as those tools only provide evidence 
to suggest the presence or absence of an attribute. The second part is almost as difficult to 
obtain; to obtain proof that a redistricting scheme was intended to benefit one party over 
another would not only be incredibly difficult, but such a revelation would be against the 
interests of the entity conducting the redistricting, as it would most likely cause the 
redistricting scheme to be overturned by the courts on that revelation alone. As such, no 
claim of proof is made in regards to the states showing significance and gerrymandering.   
While demographic voting models can prove to be powerful tools by which we 
can predict elections, they inevitably leave out important indicators of voting behavior. 
These omissions tend to include an individual candidate's platform, ideals, and campaign 
performance. Though the model that we created is a good predictor of partisanship, there 
are certain attributes that contribute to voting behavior that were not able to directly 
include in addition to individual candidate preference. There were two potentially 
important metrics of conservative support that were not used in this exercise, firearm 
ownership and church membership. Currently, there are no comprehensible datasets of 
firearm ownership for the United States. The dataset that is closest to achieving this is 
privately held by the National Rifle Association, which includes information on NRA 
members for the purposes of advocacy and political organizing (Freiss, 2013). Currently, 
this dataset is not available for use outside of the NRA, but could potentially be 
extremely valuable for these purposes if obtained. Furthermore, while there are several 
datasets that incorporate church membership and other indicators of religiosity in a given 
area, none were adequate for this project. The most reliable of these, provided by the 
Association of Religious Data Archives (ARDA), was not compatible with this study. 
This was due to the fact that the highest granularity available came in form of counties, 
	   62	  
which could not be attributed to Census tracts in order to make the data compatible with 
other demographic data (though the converse would be true)(ARDA, 2016). Furthermore, 
church attendance tends to be different from a spatial point of view than voting. Where 
voting is limited to the precinct that contains the tract in which a person resides, church 
attendance is not strictly limited by geographic area. This provides us with two metrics 
for religious datasets so they may be used accurately for this purpose. First, the data must 
be in a form such that it is attributable to Census tracts. Second, the spatial location of 
churches is not adequate due to inconsistency in geographic constraint between church 
attendance and voting location; instead, a dataset would need to include the count of 
religious persons whom reside inside a particular Census tract. Only once these two 
conditions are met will religion be able to be included in future models using this 
methodology.  
 Moreover, the model is unable to include interactions between different 
demographic indicators. For example, the model was trained using "black" as a race and 
"woman" as a sex; it does not take into account the interaction of these two demographics 
in the form of a composite demographic, a black woman. This is true for any number of 
combinations of demographics that may be found in the field. While this may seem to be 
a purely semantic issue, the interaction of these demographics in a single voter should not 
be underestimated. While this is a major pitfall, it is not insurmountable. These data exist 
in the individual paper and digital Census reply forms, but it is not recorded and compiled 
for public use by the U.S. Census Bureau. In order to discover the impact of these 
demographics on voting behavior, the Census Bureau would need to expand their datasets 
to include composite demographics. 
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Finally, there are other ways in which the model could have been constructed. 
First, a different method of measuring electoral results could have been employed instead 
of the competitive district method employed in this exercise. This could have come in the 
form of using a different method of factoring in incumbency. Instead of simply removing 
incumbents, the electoral effects of incumbency could have been counteracted by creating 
an artificial weight to the data, as was done in this study to compensate for the lack of 
religious data. Another method that could have been used to pair electoral results to 
demographics could have been in the use of presidential vote totals in each congressional 
district, instead of the respective elections for U.S. House in each district.  This would 
provide a more stable form of partisanship in a district by making it less vulnerable to the 
common midterm-presidential cycle swing between voting participation that is common 
in American politics, and by counteracting the effect of third parties in “splitting” the 
binary voting option that is consistent with the literature.  
Although these factors combine to contribute to the 0.43 adjusted r-squared of the 
model, it has been shown that this model is the most reliable currently available using 
demographics from the American Community Survey. 
Moving forward, there are many realms in which this exercise could lead to future 
work in both the academic and political realms. The first academic work that could come 
out of this would require the use of the same methodology of creating the randomized 
districts (or using the same randomized district maps), and modifying the method in 
which the electoral results are predicted. This would require going beyond the potential 
overhaul of the linear model as previously discussed, instead opting for a totally different 
prediction method. This could come in the form of many possibilities, including beta 
regression, neural networks, k-nearest neighbors, or even machine learning. While these 
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methods are not commonly used in political science, it would not be a sizeable leap to 
assume that they may be commonplace in the future, as more advanced prediction 
methods take hold in the discipline.  
Future work that could come out of this exercise could also come in the form of 
studying the electoral results of redistricting schemes that have imposed compactness 
measures in comparison to randomized districts, like the ones created in this model. 
Conversely, a compactness measure could be written into a randomization algorithm, 
allowing the predicted electoral results of various redistricting schemes be compared to a 
randomized baseline of natural partisanship. An extension of this could be found in the 
use of GPMetis, which inherently draws relatively compact districts due to the logic that 
it employs to assign individual nodes. The use of this logic in graph partitioning 
applications in redistricting deserves its own study, as the potential implications on 
literature surrounding compactness measures in congressional districts are profound.  
This work, through its establishment of a baseline of partisanship and 
determination of the partisan makeup of a delegation that a state should likely send to the 
U.S. House of Representatives, serves as a major boost to the literature that may also 
have impacts in the realm of politics in America. This is because this method may be 
seen as an important first step toward a concrete mathematical definition of 
gerrymandering. By creating a comparison between the delegations that a redistricting 
plan and an adequately sized set of randomized districts using the same predictive tools, 
this method may serve as an important step in creating judicially manageable standards to 
resolve gerrymandering disputes, as laid out in Vieth v. Jubelier. The predictive methods 
may be modified for each state, with the voting indicators and granularity changed in 
such a way as to make an individual model for each state with more accuracy than could 
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be achieved using the methodology of this exercise, and could also be carried out for state 
legislative districts. This would not only expedite the judicial review process regarding 
redistricting, but may allow the creation of national standards that would meet the 
requirement against monitoring only certain states as outlined in Shelby v. Holder 
(Shelby, 2013).  
Once this definition of gerrymandering is established, it may also be modified to 
identify incumbent-oriented gerrymandering. This can be done by drawing multiple 
iterations of a single district in a state that has been found to be a significant based on the 
methodology in this exercise, with the initial node being constrained to the boundaries of 
the district in question. If this set of iterations is not found to be significant, this provides 
evidence to suggest that the significant redistricting scheme was party motivated rather 
than motivated to protect incumbency. In doing this, the gap in the literature regarding 
the impact of part level gerrymandering and incumbent-based gerrymandering can start to 
be filled.  
Finally, each of these methods may be automated through the creation of software 
and software attachments that can detect redistricting plans that show significantly 
different representation than is likely by chance. Such software could serve as the 
antithesis of current software used for gerrymandering, such as Esri’s Redistricting and 
Caliper’s Maptitude software, as the logic used in this exercise has been shown to 
identify significantly biased districting schemes based on the assumptions of this 
particular linear model (Shupe, 2016). This software development could be modified to 
take into account all of the requirements placed upon the redistricting process by various 
authorities, including constraints surrounding minority representation, communities of 
interest, compactness, and many others, ensuring proposed redistricting plans meet the 
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spirit and substance required by the law. Further developments in this line of software 
could serve to automate the redistricting process. This could by done through an 
adaptation of the methodology employed in this exercise, and randomly drawing districts 
that meet certain constraints; the simulated redistricting that best meets all of these 
requirements for a given state would then be adopted for the actual redistricting.  In doing 
this the impact of human hands on the redistricting process would be greatly reduced, 
thus preserving the stability in the political process that democratic theorists consider 
critical for the operation of a democratic republic.  
 
  
A       B 
Figure 6.8. Current South Carolina congressional Districts (A) and Simulated congressional 
Districts (B). Red represents Republican-controlled Districts, while blue represents Democratic controlled 
districts.  
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 Figure 6.9. Simulated South Carolina districts Superimposed on actual districts 
One major example of where this is software and method could be applied comes 
in the form of in South Carolina, as depicted in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4. Figure 4.3 A 
shows the current congressional districts in South Carolina, while Figure 4.3 B shows a 
simulated redistricting that has predicted results that conform with the average predicted 
result for the state. These two plans are superimposed in Figure 4.4, in which purple areas 
represent areas that differ between the two redistrictings, blue areas are represented by 
the Democratic Party in both, and red areas are those that are represented by the 
Republican Party in both redistricting schemes. Why is this important? South Carolina 
was one of the states that were required to submit proposed congressional redistricting 
plans for preclearance to the U.S. Justice Department or the D.C. Circuit Court to prevent 
racial gerrymandering. Its districts were challenged on constitutional grounds, citing 
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violations to the fourteenth amendment surrounding racial gerrymandering, the fourteenth 
amendment on the grounds of vote dilatation racial gerrymandering, and violation of the 
Voting Rights Act on the grounds of racial gerrymandering (Backus, 2014). This legal 
challenge was unsuccessful, however, as the court ruled that the plaintiffs were unable to 
prove that race was the motive for drawing the districts in such a fashion, and that the 
plaintiffs had no standing to sue, as they did not live in the disputed districts. Further 
justification for this ruling was that the plaintiffs’ use of the compactness measure to 
“prove” racial gerrymandering was inadequate. However, had they used the mathematical 
theory and applied the methodology utilized in this exercise, they may have been able to 
overcome the shortcomings that ultimately defeated their case.  
 
Figure 6.10. South Carolina District 1 (National Atlas, 2013) 
First, this would have come by using representation, and not compactness, as the 
measure by which they examined gerrymandering in this particular instance. According 
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to this model and shown in Table 5.2 and Figures 6.8 and 6.9, South Carolina should 
have four districts that are represented by the Democratic Party, instead of the single 
Democratic district seen today. This, when combined with the fact that most Democratic 
representatives in the deep south are members of minorities, could have served to boost 
the plaintiffs’ claims of racial gerrymandering. This could have also solidified their claim 
to standing by demonstrating that a Democrat may have represented the congressional 
district that the plaintiffs reside in, had the redistricting map been different. Furthermore, 
the standing of the plaintiffs would have been further illustrated by pointing out the non-
contiguity of District 1; as illustrated in Figure 6.10 (an official U.S. Government 
Publication), the district breaks contiguity in several places. To remedy this, the entire 
region of the state would have to be redistricted, thus effecting many other districts in the 
state (and quite possibly those resided in by the plaintiffs. Essentially, if the mathematical 
theory and methods used in this exercise were adopted by the plaintiffs in their argument, 
South Carolina may have had very different districts today.   
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Appendix 
 
1.1 Census Tract Assignment to Existing congressional Districts 
 
This paper utilized key resources provided by the United States Census Bureau in the 
form of shapefiles (.shp) and geodatabases (.gdb): 
•   American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates for 2007-2011 and 2008-
2012 (2007-2011 in the format of Census blocks; 2008-2012 in the format of Census 
tracts) 
•   congressional  Districts  from  the  2002  and  2012  congressional Redistricting 
Plans 
 
1.2 congressional District Demographic Aggregation 
For  each  of  these  congressional  districts,  demographics  were  assembled  using  the 
Dissolve operation from the Data Management Tools Toolbox using the SUM criteria as 
the recorded data for the spatial database record in ArcMap 10.2.2. 
 
1.3 ACS Metrics Considered for the Model: 
Race, Hispanic/Latino Origin; Family Type by Presence and Age of Own Children Under 
18  Years;  Educational  Attainment  for  the  Population  25  Years  and  Older;  Ratio  of 
Income to Poverty Level in Past 12 Months; Household Income in the Past 12 Months; 
Median Household Income in the Past 12 Months; Public Assistance Income or Food 
Stamps/SNAP in the Past 12 Months for Households; Gini Index of Income Inequality; 
Median Family Income in The Past 12 Months; Per Capita Income in the Past 12 Months; 
Sex by Veteran Status for the   Civilian Population 18 years and Older; Employment 
Status for the Population 16 Years and Older; Occupancy Status; Imputation of Race 
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1.4 Software 
All of the demographic data utilized in this paper may be obtained from the U.S. Census 
Bureau. The spatial manipulation and neighbor analysis was carried out using ArcMap 
10.2.2, an ESRI propriety GIS suite. Attempts to do similar manipulations on the data  
using other GIS software (Q GIS, Oracle, SmallWorld, etc.) may result in different 
results due to differences in computational methods between software developers.  
  
	   79	  
Author’s Biography 	  
Jesse Clark was born in Machias, Maine on November 22, 1993. He grew up in 
Calais, and graduated from Calais High School in 2012. Jesse majored in political science 
at the University of Maine, with a minor in psychology and advanced coursework in 
geographic information systems. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Phi 
Kappa Phi, Alpha Lambda Delta, and is a proud brother of the Sigma Phi Epsilon 
Fraternity. He has received the University of Maine Presidential Merit Scholarship, the 
Robert B. Thompson Memorial Award for political science, and the Margaret Chase 
Smith Public Policy Scholarship. He was a Madigan Intern for Senator Angus King, Jr. 
(2015), and selected to participate in the U.S. Congress- Republic of Korea National 
Assembly Exchange Program.  
Upon graduation, Jesse plans to enroll in a PhD program in political Science at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to study American politics and methods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
